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ABSTRACT
The study of influence maximization in social networks has largely
ignored disparate effects these algorithms might have on the in-
dividuals contained in the social network. Individuals may place
a high value on receiving information, e.g. job openings or adver-
tisements for loans. While well-connected individuals at the center
of the network are likely to receive the information that is being
distributed through the network, poorly connected individuals are
systematically less likely to receive the information, producing a
gap in access to the information between individuals. In this work,
we study how best to spread information in a social network while
minimizing this access gap.
We propose to use the maximin social welfare function as an
objective function, where we maximize the minimum probability of
receiving the information under an intervention. We prove that in
this setting this welfare function constrains the access gap whereas
maximizing the expected number of nodes reached does not. We
also investigate the difficulties of using the maximin, and present
hardness results and analysis for standard greedy strategies. Finally,
we investigate practical ways of optimizing for the maximin, and
give empirical evidence that a simple greedy-based strategy works
well in practice.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Online social networks; • Information sys-
tems → Social recommendation; • Theory of computation →
Graph algorithms analysis.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Information flow in networks has been a subject of extensive study.
Among the many motivations for the study of how information
propagates in a network has been advertising (how can we spread
information most effectively on a budget) and clustering (how do
groups form and organize in a network).
One of the most important questions in this area is how to maxi-
mize influence in a social network. Here the goal is to choose where
to place initial sources of information so as to maximize the flow of
information via word-of-mouth. First formalized by Kempe, Klein-
berg, and Tardos [21], there has been a long series of work in the
literature on influence maximization.
However, this work has not typically focused on the impact that
the information has on the individuals in the network. For example,
one important application of information flow in networks is for
recruitment. Social networks like LinkedIn are increasingly used to
provide access to jobs and information that can greatly impact an
individual’s career development. Often just as important as the indi-
viduals themselves are the connections between individuals – their
social networks – in making hiring decisions. This is because infor-
mation transmitted amongst social networks may accrue amongst
the best-connected individuals in the network. As the adage goes,
“it’s not what you know, but who you know.” With more and more
of our social life mediated through online networks, the role that
networks play in opening up opportunities is increasingly impor-
tant. This includes not only recruitment, but also advertising and
other kinds of marketing.
However, network structure can create haves and have-nots in
the game of access. Insiders who are well-connected in the network
have easier access to relevant information about opportunities
for advancement that can in turn lead to even better connections.
Outsiders who lack access to such information will find it much
harder to improve their network status. This access gap may lead
to a form of inequality that is different from the traditional forms
of inequality based on class, race, gender, or other attributes, but
nonetheless provides a significant challenge.
Thus, we are concerned with each individual’s access to infor-
mation and not just the number of people reached or the amount of
information being distributed. Howmight we ensure that the access
gap in information is reduced? Rather than asking how far we can
spread information on a budget, we instead ask which people are
getting the information we’re spreading.
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1.1 Our Work
How can we formulate a notion of equitable access to information
in a network, and how might we intervene in a network (on a
budget) to minimize the gap in access to information? In particular,
we examine how best to add seeds (individuals who start with the
information) to a network to minimize this gap in access.
We propose a new measure of access in a network. In contrast
to previous work that maximizes the average probability that an
individual receives the information (max reach), we instead pro-
pose to maximize the minimum probability. We formalize access
as a social welfare function that assigns a real value to the set of
utilities received by the individuals, in this case the probabilities of
receiving the information. This allows us to evaluate the notions
of access themselves: we consider a notion of access to be better if
interventions that optimally maximize that notion do not widen the
access gap. We show that every notion of access (amongst a wide
class of such functions) does to some degree permit the access gap
to increase in the worst case. On the other hand, if the access gap
increases between two groups of individuals after an intervention,
we show that our proposed notion of access at least prohibits situa-
tions where the access does not increase at all for the group which
started off with less access to the intervention. Perhaps surprisingly,
we show in Section 3 that a very large class of natural notions of
access (including maximum reach) does not have this very basic
prohibition. We desire this because without such a prohibition, in
the worst case there’s nothing stopping interventions from creating
one permanently and significantly advantaged group with access
to information and one group without any such access, which we
regard as blatantly undesirable.
We show that maximizing the minimum probability is NP-hard,
hard even to approximate well, and moreover that a number of
standard greedy strategies have asymptotically worst-possible ap-
proximation ratios. Nonetheless, we show via experiments that
a very simple greedy strategy performs well in practice: namely,
choose the seeds to be the vertices currently estimated as having
the smallest probabilities of receiving the information. We also
demonstrate that by using this strategy, we decrease the correlation
between vertices’ probability of receiving the information and their
location in the network, indicating that our measure of access is
not merely a proxy for (static) network structure.
Limitations. We recognize that asking to maximize the minimum
probability of access to information ignores the fact that not all in-
dividuals in a network might need a particular piece of information.
For example, a hiring ad should be spread widely, but only to candi-
dates who are eligible, are in the right geographic areas, and have
desirable qualifications. More generally, interventions to improve
access to information might themselves cause feedback loops (both
virtuous and vicious): our work does not consider those dynamics.
Nor does our work consider other notions of utility, like those that
take into account the benefits of receiving the information more
than once. We leave study of these issues for future work.
In summary, our main contributions are as follows.
• We propose a new measure of information access in a net-
work. We demonstrate that this measure captures certain
axiomatically desirable properties of any notion of equal
access, and further that existing notions including the well-
studied maximum reach concept do not.
• We investigate the problem of maximizing access theoreti-
cally, presenting hardness results as well as analysis of stan-
dard greedy strategies.
• We do a comprehensive empirical evaluation of heuristics
for achieving a high level of access, demonstrating that a
greedy-based strategy is quite effective at improving equality
of access in a network for a given budget of interventions.
1.2 Related Work
Granovetter’s seminal work on the strength of weak ties [16] first
broached the idea that network position can confer advantages or
disadvantages (including in hirings scenarios). Indeed, weak ties
can influence success in hiring and careers [15]. In an algorithmic
setting, boyd, Levy, and Marwick [4] illustrate how modern social
networks like LinkedIn might be vehicles for a more direct propaga-
tion of advantage and disadvantage. In that light, our work, which
focuses on how tomitigate such effects in the context of information
access, falls into the paradigm explored by fairness-aware decision-
making in which the goal is to design decision-making systems that
ensure the end result is non-discriminatory to individuals or groups
of individuals. Our work can be viewed as an attempt to quantify
one aspect of social capital, a notion introduced by Coleman [7] to
capture how social standing within a system could be interpreted
as a resource that has utility for an agent. Recently, Benthall and
Haynes [3] consider how to use a social network to define racial
aspects of social standing, but don’t consider interventions in the
social network.
Rather than directly model an explicit fair goal for a decision in
this setting, via assuming we have access to a sensitive feature like
race on which we would focus our attention, we instead model the
utility that each individual receives. This formalizes how best to
optimize for access to information without necessarily requiring
equal access. While most of the literature in algorithmic fairness
uses equality-based definitions [9–11, 18, 27, 33, 36] (typically ei-
ther group fairness or individual fairness), the welfare approach
to fairness that we use is starting to become more popular. For
example, Heidari et al. [19] propose a specific welfare function to
use for classification and regression problems.
Our choice of welfare function is based on axiomatic considera-
tions: by determining which functions satisfy specific mathematical
criteria used to model gaps in access. The resulting function that
seeks to maximize the minimum probability of receiving informa-
tion bears some resemblance to the difference principle outlined by
Rawls [30], in that it seeks to intervene so as to provide benefit
to the “least-advantaged”, here interpreted as those with the least
probability of access.
Our work relies on a framework for information propagation
that comes from the broad area of influence maximization. Influ-
ence maximization seeks ways to spread information in a network
efficiently using a small collection of seeds. The typical measure
of information spread used is the expected number of nodes that
receive the information (the max reach measure). While influence
maximization assigns the same utility to an individual as we do,
the welfare function in that setting is just the sum of the individ-
ual utilities. This utilitarian approach was initiated by Domingos
and Richardson [31] and is formalized as a discrete optimization
problem in Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos [21]. There is also work
into making this process faster [5, 34] or suitable for more general
situations, where factors like pricing must be taken into account [2].
A related body of algorithmic work [12, 25, 26] posits that one
way to decrease polarization in social networks is to connect people
with opposing views by exposing them to new information. Such
work differs in focus and approach to modeling from this work
because that work is concerned with poor connectivity between
communities and we are concerned with individuals who are simply
poorly connected.
2 DEFINITIONS
Let G be a graph with n nodes. To describe information flow in
G we will use a standard probabilistic model for how information
travels – the independent cascade (IC) model [21]. In this model, a
node either possesses information or not. A set of seed nodes start
out with the information, and information flow proceeds in rounds.
Each newly informed node v informs its neighbors u in the next
round i.i.d. with probability of transmission αu,v . Once a node is
informed, it stays informed, and no longer passes on the message.
In this work, we will use the IC model with a fixed probability α of
transmission.
Welfare Functions. In the IC model with parameter α , we can
associate with each vertex v the probability pv that v is informed
after all information has been passed.We now define a social welfare
function µ : [0, 1]n → R to represent how effectively information is
spread: it takes as input the probability of infection for each vertex,
and outputs the overall welfare.
Definition 1. The welfare of a set of verticesV = {v1, . . . ,v |V |}
in G with seed set S is µG (S,V ) = µ(pv1 , . . . ,pv |V | ). If V is all n
vertices, we abbreviate this as µG (S).
When the graph is clear from context, we will omit the subscript G
and write µ(S,V ) and µ(S) respectively.
Seed sets represent an intervention in the information network.
Thus, a primary goal in the study of information flow is to find
a budgeted intervention: a set of seeds S+ of size no more than k
for a given graph G (possibly with initial seeds S) with maximum
welfare
S∗ = argmax
S+∪S :
|S | ≤k
µG (S+ ∪ S).
In other words, S∗ is the initial seeds S along with a set of k vertices
which maximizes access for G. Later, we will also consider the set
of seeds that maximize welfare for a particular set of vertices:
SV = argmax
S+∪S :
|S | ≤k
µG (S+ ∪ S,V ).
Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos [21] and subsequent work use as
their welfare function reach, the expected number of nodes reached.
In our notation, and normalizing to make it conveniently [0, 1]-
valued, this becomes the following:
Definition 2 (Reach). µreach(S,V ) = 1|V |
∑
v ∈V pv .
We can easily generalize this to awider class of notions of welfare.
We consider generalized means:
Definition 3 (ϕ-mean). µϕ (S,V ) =
(
1
|V |
∑
v ∈V p
ϕ
v
)1/ϕ
.
Note in the limit, this becomes the geometric mean for ϕ = 0,
the minimum for ϕ = −∞, and the maximum for ϕ = +∞. In other
words, µ−∞(S,V ) = minv ∈V pv .
We say that a function µG (S,V ) = µ(x1, . . . ,xm ), each xi ∈ [0, 1]
representing the probability that a node i receives the information,
is monotonically increasing if µ(x1, . . . ,xm ) ≥ µ(x ′1, . . . ,x ′m ) when
xi ≥ x ′i for all i . A function µ is strictly monotonically increas-
ing if µ(x1, . . . ,xm ) > µ(x ′1, . . . ,x ′m ) when xi ≥ x ′i for all i and
in addition there is some j such that x j > x ′j . µ is symmetric if
µ(x1, . . . ,xm ) = µ(xσ (1), . . . ,xσ (m)) for all permutations σ .
In this work, we restrict our attention to symmetric, monotoni-
cally increasing welfare functions so that no vertex is privileged
above the others and, all else equal, increasing an individual’s
probability of receiving the information is never undesirable. The
ϕ-means are such functions. Moreover, if a continuous welfare
function satisfies four natural conditions (symmetry, strictly mono-
tonically increasing, independence of unconcerned agents, and
independence of common scale1) as a consequence of the Debreu-
Gorman theorem [8, 14] the only such welfare functions up to
ordering over preferences are the ϕ-means [19, 32], as long as all
probabilities are non-zero. In other words, at least in the case of
connected undirected graphs, ϕ-means are an extremely wide class
of symmetric, monotonically increasing welfare functions, making
them a natural class to examine.
3 GAPS IN ACCESS
Optimizing a welfare function is a way to improve access to infor-
mation in the aggregate. But our concern in this work is whether
individuals or subgroups are being left behind in the process. Is
it possible that even though an aggregate measure of information
access is increasing, the gap in information access between groups
is getting larger? In this section, we will focus on evaluating welfare
functions with respect to information access properties we would
like to ensure.
We now define the access gap, which captures how much better
some individuals are doing than others.
Definition 4. The access gap of a (non-trivial) partitionV ,V ′ of
the vertices of a graphG with seed set S under a welfare function µ is
µ(S,V ) − µ(S,V ′).
Note we only define the access gap over bipartitions, rather than
arbitrary subsets. This is to prevent the following situation: Given
a partition V1,V2,V3 of G and initial seed set S , suppose µ(S,V1) =
µ(S,V2) are both very large, but µ(S,V3) is much smaller. Consider
S∗, the optimal seed set for this graph, and suppose now µ(S∗,V1) >
µ(S∗,V2) = µ(S∗,V3). We now have a gap between the access of V1
andV2, but this gap was a by-product of significantly increasing the
1Independence of common scale means that the ordering over alternatives should
not change when multiplying each probability by a common positive factor, and
independence of unconcerned agents means that the ordering should be independent
of a probability that doesn’t change, i.e. if µ(x, x1, . . . , xm ) ≥ µ(x, x ′1, . . . , x ′m ),
then µ(y, x1, . . . , xm ) ≥ µ(y, x ′1, . . . , x ′m ) for all y .
Figure 1: Example showing that the rich can get richer under
the optimal intervention. If only one additional seed may
be added, it isv2 for any monotonic welfare measure. Under
this intervention, the access gap between {v1,v2} and {v3,v4}
(the two colored sets) widens.
access ofV3. Since this may well be desirable behavior, we preclude
this situation by only considering gaps between bipartitions.
In particular, we want to know when the access gap increases.
We call this the rich getting richer phenomenon.
Definition 5 (Rich get richer). In a graph G with initial seeds
S under a welfare function µ, we say that the rich get richer if there
is a (non-trivial) partition V ,V ′ where the optimal intervention S∗
satisfies
µ(S∗,V ′) − µ(S∗,V ) > µ(S,V ′) − µ(S,V ) > 0.
Unfortunately, stopping the rich from getting richer in arbitrary
graphs may be too much to hope for. Even simple examples show
that under many notions of welfare, including all ϕ-means, the rich
get richer.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose µ is symmetric, increasing, and satisfies
the following condition: For any x1, . . . , xm in [0, 1], there is some
1 ≤ ϕ < ∞ such that
min
i
xi ≤ µ(x1, . . . ,xm ) ≤
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
x
ϕ
i
)1/ϕ
.
Then under µ, when 0 < α < 12ϕ , there exists a graph and initial seed
set where the rich get richer.
Note that the upper bound in this third condition is easy to
satisfy; it suffices that µ(x1, . . . ,xm ) is strictly less than maxi xi
when not all of the xi are equal to each other. In addition the
assumption that ϕ ≥ 1 is only assumed for the sake of convenience,
since
(
1
m
∑
x
ϕ
i
)1/ϕ
is monotonic in ϕ.
Proof. Consider the example graphG in Figure 1 and suppose
0 < α < 1. Let V = {v3,v4} and V ′ = {v1,v2}. Note that pv1 =
1, pv2 = α , and pv3 = pv4 = α2. Then µ(S,V ) = µ(pv3 ,pv4 ) =
µ(α2,α2) = α2. Yet µ(S,V ′) = µ(1,α) ≥ α > α2, so we have
µ(S,V ′) > µ(S,V ).
What is the optimal seed to add? If we add v2 to the seeds, then
we have pv1 = pv2 = 1 and pv3 = pv4 = α . Otherwise, if we
add v3 to the seeds, then pv1 = pv3 = 1, pv2 = α , and pv4 = α2.
Note µ(1, 1,α ,α) ≥ µ(1,α , 1,α2) by symmetry and monotonicity,
so without loss of generality the optimal modification is to makev2
a seed. Then it is easy to calculate µ(S∗,V ′) − µ(S∗,V ) = µ(1, 1) −
µ(α2,α2) = 1 − α2. Thus we have the rich getting richer if 1 − α >
µ(1,α) − α2. But µ(1,α) ≤
(
1+αϕ
2
)1/ϕ
, so it suffices to show that
1+αϕ
2 <
(
1 − α + α2)ϕ . Then since ϕ ≥ 1 and 0 < α < 12ϕ ,
1 + αϕ
2 ≤
1 + α
2 < 1 − ϕα + ϕα
2 ≤ (1 − α + α2)ϕ .
□
Proposition 3.1 holds for all ϕ-means for ϕ < ∞. We will show
in Section 3.1 that the rich get richer not only for the +∞-mean but
a whole other class of welfare functions as well (a consequence of
Proposition 3.2). Given this, keeping the rich from getting richer
appears to be too much to hope for.
3.1 k-imbalance
If we can’t keep the rich from getting richer in the worst case, what
can we prevent? A particularly concerning case of the rich getting
richer is when the access of the worse-off groupV doesn’t improve
at all. That is, a case where µ(S,V ′) > µ(S,V ) under the initial seeds
S and the rich get richer, but for the set of seeds S∗ that maximize
welfare µ(S∗,V ) ≤ µ(S,V ). This might not be so bad if the only
way to improve the access of V is to increase the access of V to the
point where it is even higher than that of V ′, so that V ′ becomes
the worse-off group. On the other hand, this situation becomes
particularly egregious when in addition µ(SV ,V ) ≤ µ(S,V ′), i.e. the
optimal improvement for V still does not improve the access of V
to the point where it is larger than the access that V ′ started out
with prior to intervention (recall that SV – defined in Section 2 – is
the seed set that maximizes reach for V ). If this can happen when
adding k seeds, we will call µ k-imbalanced. That is, k-imbalance is
a particularly egregious form of the rich getting richer. If µ is not
k-imbalanced for any k > 0, we will call it balanced.
We believe that balance is a natural desideratum because it pre-
vents interventions from never helping the worse-off group at all.
Stronger versions of preventing disparity in access may still be
preferred, like avoiding the rich from getting richer, so balance
may only represent a necessary but not sufficient condition for
preventing disparity. In this section, we show a wide class of µ are
Ω(n)-imbalanced, but that µ−∞ is balanced.
Definition 6 (k-imbalance). Awelfare function µ isk-imbalanced
if there exists a graph G with initial seed set S and partition of the
vertices V and V ′ where the optimal intervention S∗ and optimal in-
tervention for SV under the addition of no more than k seeds satisfies
the following:
(1) µ(S,V ) < µ(SV ,V ) (There is a set of seeds to add that im-
proves the access of V .)
(2) µ(SV ,V ) ≤ µ(S,V ′) (Not only does V ′ start off with more
access than V , but V ′ starts off with more access than V can
possibly achieve.)
(3) µ(S∗,V ′) > µ(S,V ′) (The access of V ′ improves.)
(4) µ(S∗,V ) ≤ µ(S,V ) (The access of V does not improve.)
In other words, a welfare function is imbalanced if
µ(S∗,V ) ≤ µ(S,V ) < µ(SV ,V ) ≤ µ(S,V ′) < µ(S∗,V ′).
Note that it is immediate that if µ is k-imbalanced for any k > 0,
then the rich get richer under µ. As k increases, it should be the
case that it becomes more difficult to find examples of imbalance,
as it is harder to avoid improving the access ofV ′. Nonetheless, we
can show that a wide class of welfare functions, including reach, is
Ω(n)-imbalanced:
Proposition 3.2. Suppose µ is symmetric and strictly increasing.
Then µ is Ω(n)-imbalanced.
Proof. It suffices to consider the simplest case: when there is
no communication, i.e. G is the disjoint graph of n vertices. V and
V ′ will each be exactly half of the vertices (for n even). The initial
seed set S will be entirely contained in V ′ and will be size n/4.
Now we will add an additional n/4 seeds. Note first that since µ is
symmetric, each of the vertices (with the exception of the initial
seeds) are identical. So SV is any set of n/4 additional seeds in
V : each additional seed must improve the welfare of V because µ
is strictly increasing. But in this case, V and V ′ become identical,
so we have µ(S,V ) < µ(SV ,V ) ≤ µ(S,V ′). But by symmetry, the
optimal seeds to add can be any n/4 vertices, in which case we can
assume they are all in V ′. Thus the welfare of V does not increase
while the welfare of V ′ does. □
It turns out that balance is a useful definition, insomuch as it is
actually possible to achieve.
Proposition 3.3. µ−∞ is balanced.
Proof. Suppose µ−∞ is imbalanced, witnessed by some parti-
tion V ,V ′ of G and initial seed set S . Recall imbalance implies that
µ−∞(S,V ) < µ−∞(S,V ′). Then by definition of µ−∞, the vertex v
with minimum probability is in V , i.e. µ−∞(S) = µ−∞(S,V ). Re-
member S∗ maximizes the minimum probability, and µ−∞(SV ,V ) >
µ−∞(S,V ), so there is at least one graph that increases that mini-
mum probability, which in turn means that S∗ does as well. Thus
µ−∞(S∗,V ) > µ−∞(S,V ), a contradiction. □
On the other hand, µ−∞ is a special case, and every other ϕ-
mean is maximally imbalanced: there exists a graph, initial seed
set, and partition of the vertices that verifies the other ϕ-means are
imbalanced.
Proposition 3.4. For ϕ > −∞,α < 1, µϕ is Ω(n)-imbalanced.
Proof. If ϕ = +∞, so µϕ is the maximum probability, then as
soon as the graph has at least one seed, then µϕ (S) = 1, and any
added seeds after that don’t change the value, so µϕ is trivially
Ω(n)-imbalanced. Otherwise, if ϕ > 0, µϕ is strictly increasing, and
from Proposition 3.2 we know it is Ω(n)-imbalanced. And if ϕ ≤ 0,
then µϕ is strictly increasing once all probabilities are non-zero, at
which point we use a similar tactic to when µ is strictly increasing,
except we will need a connected graph. We will use the star graph,
with one central vertex the seed, and all other vertices connected
to that seed. In addition there will be some n/2− 1 additional seeds,
all in V ′, which consists of those seeds, the central seed, plus n/2
more vertices. V will be the other n vertices, so that G is 2n nodes.
Our goal will be to add an additional n/2 seeds. Remember, sinceG
is connected (all vertices have non-zero probability) µϕ is strictly
increasing. Then the optimal graph forV is to add all n/2 additional
seeds to V , in which case we have n/2 vertices with probability 1
and n/2 vertices with probability α . ButV ′ inG is exactly the same,
so we have µ(S,V ) < µ(SV ,V ) ≤ µ(S,V ′). However, all non-seeds
are isomorphic, so we may assume all n/2 new seeds are added to
V ′. □
v
S1 S2 S3
x1 x2 x3
Figure 2: Corresponds with the set cover problem ‘Is there
k = 1 set among S1 = {x1,x2}, S2 = {x2,x3}, S3 = {x3} that
cover all elements?’ Note that since the answer is no, then
the minimum probability is no more than px3 = 1− (1−α2)2.
We note that one could consider many variations of ϕ-means,
including replacing mean with median, maximum with minimum,
etc. These variations do not affect the results that we present here.
We defer a detailed analysis of these variations to the full version
of the paper.
4 MAXIMIN ACCESS
The previous section established µ−∞ as a better access measure
than others, at least when it comes to achieving balance. We now
study the problem of maximizing µ−∞, which we call the maximin
access problem. We start by showing that this is NP-hard even to
approximate well.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose α <
√
5−1
2 . Then choosing k seeds to maxi-
mize min access is NP-hard. In this case, the maximin access cannot be
approximated better than O(α) and if furthermore α = O(1/n) then
the maximum cannot be attained efficiently without an additional
O(lnn) factor seeds.
Proof. We reduce from Set Cover, where an instance is de-
fined by a collection of subsets S1, . . . , Sm over a ground set U =
{x1, . . . ,xn } and an integer k , and the decision problem is whether
or not there is a collection of k subsets whose union is U . Further,
we can assume k < n < m. Given such an instance, we construct a
directed graph (example showed in Figure 2). We start with the nat-
ural directed bipartite graph corresponding to a set cover instance,
where there is a vertex i corresponding with each set Si and a vertex
j corresponding with each element x j . There is a directed edge from
i to j whenever x j is contained in Si . We then add a single extra
vertex v and directed edges from v to each vertex i corresponding
with one of the sets, and ask to maximize the minimum probability
by adding k + 1 seeds.
Since v has in-degree zero, in order for the maximin access to
be greater than zero, v must be chosen as a seed. In this case, since
k < m, regardless of which seeds are chosen, there is some set Si
such that pi = α . Therefore the maximum min access is no more
than α . Without loss of generality, no vertex corresponding to an
element x j need be chosen as a seed. Otherwise, the seed may be
moved to any vertex corresponding with a set Si such that x j ∈ Si .
The maximin access cannot go down, because we still have pj ≥ α .
If there is a set cover, then the maximum min access is at least α :
choose the vertices corresponding to the cover for the seeds (plus
v), in which case pv = 1, pi ≥ α because they are either seeds or
distance one fromv , andpj ≥ α , because they are distance one from
a seed. If there is no set cover, then there is no way to choose the
seeds amongst the Si such that all vertices are within distance one
from a seed. Assume that every element x j is contained in at most
two subsets amongst the Si (this is now the Vertex Cover problem,
an NP-hard special case of Set Cover). So there must be some pj
such that pj ≤ 1 − (1 − α2)2. Thus when α > 1 − (1 − α2)2, i.e. α <√
5−1
2 , any algorithm that maximizes the min access chooses the set
cover if there is one. So any algorithm that has an approximation
ratio strictly better than 1−(1−α
2)2
α = O(α) must in fact be exact,
and therefore also find the set cover.
Even in the general case of Set Cover, we can still distinguish
between when there is and is not a set cover: The existence of a set
cover still means the maximin probability is at least α , while the lack
of a set cover implies there is at least one vertex with probability
no more than 1 − (1 − α2)m , which is upper-bounded by α when
α = 1/m. Therefore, since set cover is O(lnn)-inapproximable, we
cannot approximate the best k seeds to add without an additional
O(lnn)-factor seeds. □
Moreover, if we can find the seeds that maximize the minimum
probability, even approximately, we can boost this result to also
compute the minimum probability itself approximately. This serves
as additional evidence that this problem is hard, as there is no known
method to even approximately compute the minimum probability.
Proposition 4.2. If there is an α f (n)-approximation algorithm for
maximin access, there is an α2f (n)+2-approximation for the minimum
access of a vertex in a graphG given a seed s . That is, if the minimum
access is pmin in G, then we can given an estimate pˆ such that
α2f (n)+2pmin ≤ pˆ ≤ (1/α)2f (n)+2pmin.
Proof. Given an instance (G, s,α), we construct a graphG ′ sim-
ilar to the one in Figure 5. (We may assume that G is connected.) If
the diameter of G is ℓ, add to G a simple undirected path of length
ℓ starting from s , and call it G ′. Call the end of this path v . In G,
pmin ≥ α ℓ , which means that if we compute the single optimal seed
in G ′, it must be on the path from s to v .
Define x so that α ℓ−x = αx · pmin, i.e. x = ℓ/2 − log(1/pmin)2 log(1/α ) .
Then the optimal placement for a seed is at distance k from s ,
where ⌊x⌋ ≤ k ≤ ⌈x⌉, because for any k we have p′v = α ℓ−k and
p′min = α
k · pmin, where p′ denotes probabilities in G ′.
Suppose that we have a (1/α)f (n)-approximation algorithm for
maximin access, and it chooses some seed distance k ′ from s (we
may assume that the seed is on the simple path, otherwise we may
always choose k ′ = 0). Since it is a (1/α)f (n)-approximation on a
simple path, k ′ must be within f (n) of k . Now we can approximate
pmin using k ′ as an estimate of k : We estimate it as pˆ = α ℓ−2k
′ .
Then α ℓ−2k ′ ≤ α ℓ−2(k+f (n) ≤ α ℓ−2(x+1+f (n)), and likewise
α ℓ−2k ′ ≥ α ℓ−2(x−1−f (n)), so this is within α2f (n)+2 of pmin =
α ℓ−2x .
□
4.1 Maximin algorithms
The above results imply that it is hard tomaximize µ−∞ even approx-
imately. Nonetheless, Theorem 4.1 still leaves open the possibility
of an αc -approximation (for fixed number of seeds and c > 1). In
this section, we present the heuristics we will use, along with a few
baselines. We will show in Section 4.2 that, unfortunately, these
natural heuristics have a worst-possible approximation ratio (a ratio
exponential in n). These results do not preclude good performance
in practice, which we discuss in Section 5.
Making our task yet more challenging is that, unlike maximizing
reach [21], maximin is not a submodular objective.2 Nonetheless, it
is natural to try a greedy approach, where in each iteration, we add
to the seeds the vertex that maximizes the objective function. We
refer to this heuristic as Greedy (Algorithm 1). To do this, we use
the simple approach of estimating each probability pv for every
possible vertex to add to the seed set. (See below for details on how
we estimate these probabilities.) We contrast this approach to the
Algorithm 1 Greedy
Input: Graph G, initial seed set S , number of seeds to add k
1: for k iterations do
2: for all j < S do
3: prob ← ProbEst(G, S ∪ {j}) ▷ Algorithm 4
4: nextMin[j] ← mini prob[i] ▷ The minimum
probability when the seeds are S ∪ {j}
5: v ← argminj nextMin[j]
6: add v to S
7: return S
faster approach, which we will callMyopic (Algorithm 2), whereby
we instead in each round choose the vertex with the currently
smallest probability as the new seed, without actually evaluating
the new value of the objective function.
Algorithm 2Myopic
Input: Graph G, initial seed set S , number of seeds to add k
1: k ′ ← k
2: if |S | = 0 then
3: Initialize S as the vertex with the highest degree
4: k ′ ← k − 1
5: for k ′ iterations do
6: prob ← ProbEst(G, S) ▷ Algorithm 4
7: v ← argmini prob[i] ▷ pick node with min probability
8: add v to S
9: return S
We also consider a naïve variation (Naïve Myopic, Algorithm 3)
which, instead of proceeding in rounds, given initial estimates for
the probabilities, picks for the seeds the k vertices with the smallest
probabilities.
So far, we have omitted how to estimate the probabilities for
each vertex. Unfortunately, computing the probability pv for each
vertex exactly is #P-hard [29]. Even computing probabilities of
receiving the information with a guaranteed approximation ratio
is a long-standing open problem [20]. So in this paper, we use
a Monte Carlo method, simulating the IC model a fixed number
of times, and estimating the probabilities for each vertex as the
2This can be seen using the construction in the proof of Proposition 4.4, starting with
one seed in the center of a simple path. Adding one additional seed then does nothing,
but adding two seeds increases the minimum probability.
Algorithm 3 Naïve Myopic
Input: Graph G, initial seed set S , number of seeds to add k
1: k ′ ← k
2: if |S | = 0 then
3: Initialize S as the vertex with the highest degree
4: k ′ ← k − 1
5: prob ← ProbEst(G, S) ▷ Algorithm 4
6: Add to S the k ′ vertices i < S with smallest probability prob[i]
7: return S
percent of times the information reached that vertex under the
simulations (Algorithm 4). Of course, this requires having at least
one seed, which is not the case in the first round of Myopic and
Naïve Myopic. So we always choose the first seed as vertex with
the highest degree. This approach for dealing with the first round,
as well as estimating the probabilities, provides a simple way to
compare these heuristics. As such, for the experiments we also
choose the first seed as the highest degree vertex for the Greedy
heuristic as well, again to simplify comparison. We leave for future
work other approaches for these issues.
Algorithm 4 ProbEst (Monte Carlo probability estimation)
Input: Graph G, seed set S
Parameters: α , Number of simulation rounds R
1: Initialize hits[i] ← 0 for each i a vertex of G
2: for R iterations do ▷ Simulate the IC model R times
3: for all i ∈ S do
4: hits[i]++ ▷ hits[i] is the number of times i has
received the information
5: activeQueue ← S ▷ Keep track of which vertices are
currently active
6: while activeQueue non-empty do
7: Dequeue i from activeQueue
8: for all neighbors j of i do
9: transmit ← True with probability α , else False
10: if j has not been in activeQueue and transmit then
11: hits[j]++
12: Enqueue j to activeQueue
13: prob[i] ← hits[i]/R
14: return prob
An alternative approach that avoids estimating probabilities is
to pick seeds that are far from each other, under the intuition that
a node far away from the current seeds is likely to have a small
pi and therefore should be picked as the next seed. The resulting
heuristic is to pick in each round the node that is furthest from
the current set of seeds as the next seed; we call this heuristic
Gonzalez because of its resemblance to the well-known algorithm
for k-center clustering [13].
One could choose other proxies for the utility pv such as nodes
of low degree (or high degree), or nodes that do not contain seeds
in a fixed radius ball around them. In our experiments with these
heuristics, they were dominated in both quality and performance
by the ones mentioned above, and we will not discuss them further.
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Figure 3: G
4.2 Approximation ratios of maximin
algorithms
We now show that Myopic, Naïve Myopic, Greedy, and an exact ver-
sion of Gonzalez all have approximation ratios that are exponential
in n, even if we assume the probabilities required by Myopic, Naïve
Myopic, and Greedy can be estimated exactly. This is to emphasize
that their poor behavior in the worst case doesn’t just stem from
the difficulty of approximating the probabilities given a seed set,
but the heuristics themselves.
4.2.1 Myopic and Naïve Myopic. Note that in the case k = 1, My-
opic and Naïve Myopic are identical algorithms. Thus we can show
that in this case, both algorithms behave poorly in the worst case,
even in the non-trivial case when we start with at least one initial
seed.
Proposition 4.3. Given a graph and non-zero initial seed set,
choosing as the seed with smallest pv yields a solution with approxi-
mation ratio no better than O(αn ).
Proof. Consider the graph G depicted in Figure 3. If we are
allowed to add only a single additional seed besides the initial
seed set {s}, then this algorithm will choose to add either v1 or v2,
because inG they minimize minv pv , where pv1 = pv2 = α ℓ+1. But
since we can only reach one of the two, we still have minv pv =
α ℓ+1. But the optimal vertex to add to the seed set is t , where now
minv pv ≥ α2. Then we get an approximation ratio no better than
O
(
α ℓ+1
α 2
)
= O (αn ). □
4.2.2 Greedy. We now consider what happens if Greedy is used to
choose the k seeds. One problem with Myopic was that, as demon-
strated via Figure 3, choosing the vertex with the smallest probabil-
ity ignores the actual objective function (which in that example is
maximized by choosing vertex t ). What happens when we attempt
to maximize the actual objective function? Again, we assume that
for any seed set we are given the exact probabilities instead of
approximate probabilities, which we refer to as a probability oracle.
Proposition 4.4. Greedy, even with a probability oracle, has an
approximation ratio no better than O(αn/6).
Proof. Consider the simple undirected path of length n, with no
initial seeds, where we may add k = 2 seeds. The greedy algorithm,
in the first iteration, must choose the central vertex (assume n is
even). In the second iteration, no vertex can increase the minimum
probability, so the minimum probability is αn/2. However, the opti-
mal minimum probability is much larger: If the two seeds trisect
the path so that they are n/3 apart, then no vertex is distance more
than n/3 from a seed, in which case the minimum probability is at
least αn/3. □
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Figure 5: H , which consists of a simple path of length ℓ/2,
whose vertex s is the vertex s of in-degree 0 in Hℓ/2, depicted
in Figure 4.
4.2.3 Minimax distance. Gonzalez is a heuristic to minimize the
maximum distance of any vertex from a seed. One motivation
behind this algorithm is that in Figure 3, adding an edge from s to t
inG takes care of the issues found with Myopic by ensuring that all
vertices have distance no more than two from the seed. In general,
minimizing the maximum distance exactly is difficult, but even if
we could do so, this approach still has a bad approximation ratio.
To show this, we construct a (sparse, max degree two) graph
where nonetheless the vertex t furthest away from the seed still
has a relatively high probability of receiving the information. This
is the case for Hℓ , shown in Figure 4, that’s sufficiently sparse but
pt is large.
Lemma 4.5. The probability of t being infected in Hℓ , where each
edge has weight α = 1/2, is pt = Θ(1/ℓ).
Proof. Denote by level k the vertices distance k from s , and by
symmetry, the probability of being infected at that levelpk . Wewant
to calculate pℓ . Note p0 = 1 and pk+1 = 1 − (1 − αpk )2 = pk − 14p2k ,
a variant of the logistic map.
Then 1pk+1 =
1
1
4pk (4−pk )
= 1pk +
1
4−pk . Note 1/4 ≤
1
4−pk ≤ 1/3.
Unwinding the recurrence, we get 1pk+1 =
1
p0 +
∑k
j=0
1
4−pj , and in
particular we have 1p0 +
k+1
4 ≤ 1pk+1 ≤
1
p0 +
k+1
3 , i.e.
1
pk
= Θ(k). □
Proposition 4.6. The algorithm that minimizes the maximum
distance from a seed has approximation ratio O(√n/2n/6) when α =
1/2.
Proof. Suppose we can choose at most one seed in H , shown in
Figure 5. Minimizing the max distance means the seed we use is s ,
and for sufficiently large ℓ the minimum probability is pv = α ℓ/2,
at least for α = 1/2 (using the previous lemma). However, the
optimal seed to use is x , where x is a vertex k ≤ ℓ/2 distance
from s . Under this seed set, pv remains the vertex with the mini-
mum probability of getting infected so long as, for some constant
c , α ℓ/2−k ≤ 2cαkℓ (again using the previous lemma). Solving for k
to maximize the minimum probability, we get k = ℓ/4 − log
(
ℓ
2c
)
2 log( 1α ) .
Then the approximation ratio is no better than α ℓ/2+1
α ℓ/2−k+1 = α
k =
√
ℓα ℓ/4√
2c
= O(√ℓ(1/2)ℓ/4), and finally noteH has 52 ℓ−4 edges, 32 ℓ+1
vertices, and the maximum in-degree (and out-degree) is two. □
Despite the hardness results of this section, we will show in the
next section that these algorithms perform well in practice.
5 EXPERIMENTS
Our experimental evaluation will investigate the following ques-
tion: does maximizing µ−∞ create real changes in access? Is this
different from the interventions achieved via maximum reach? And
how effective are the proposed strategies for optimizing µ−∞? Since
our goal in this paper is to introduce and validate a method for
reducing access gaps, we will not focus on achieving the fastest im-
plementations (although we will compare the efficiency of different
heuristics).
5.1 Experimental procedure
For our evaluation, we used social networks sourced from the
SNAP [23] and ICON [6] repositories as described in Table 1.
µ−∞ is a stringent objective function: it minimally requires hav-
ing at least one seed in every connected component to achieve
non-zero minimum probability, which may require a large number
of added seeds if for example there are many disconnected nodes.
Since the access gap is maximally large if there is at least one seed
and a vertex with pv = 0, we assume that the number of added
seeds is large enough to cover all components of the graph. This
allows us to add seeds to each component of the graph separately.
As a simplifying assumption, in the experiments, we only consider
the case (in directed graphs) when the components are strongly con-
nected. In particular, rather than running the heuristics on all of the
components, we just use the largest strongly connected component
of the graph.
We also varied our intervention size between k = 1 and 100,
independent of the size of the graph. This is a typical number of
seeds used for interventions in the literature, and considering the
application – recommending a job position – is a practical interven-
tion size. We varied α – the probability of message transmission
across an edge – in the range {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}3. Above this
range information spreads so effectively that all algorithms are
indistinguishable. Below this range the utilities pv obtained are
small enough that it is hard for Monte Carlo estimation to distin-
guish between them. We run 1000 simulations in order to estimate
probabilities for any given seed set and repeat each heuristic 20
times, reporting the average result.
As a baseline, we used the algorithm TIM+ [35], which was
designed to optimize maximum reach. While this procedure is not
a true baseline (it does not directly optimize minpi ), it provides
insight into how existing methods for maximum reach might work
in this newer setting. We also use as a baseline picking the k seeds
uniformly at random (which we will refer to as Random).
3We report results for α ≥ 0.3 for brevity. Behavior below this range was similar.
(a) Initial probabilities (with one seed). (b) Degree of the vertex. (c) Distance from the center.
Figure 6: Correlations between the set of probabilities of access after intervention and three proxies for position in a network
in the Arenas graph. Bars correspond to one standard deviation computed over 20 runs of each of the heuristics.
Name Nodes Edges Direction
EU [22] 803 24729 Directed
Arenas [1, 17] 1133 5451 Directed
Irvine [28] 1294 19026 Directed
Facebook [24] 4039 24729 Undirected
ca-GrQc [22] 4158 13428 Undirected
ca-HepTh [22] 8638 24827 Undirected
Table 1: Overview of the data sets we use.
5.2 Maximin and network structure
In practice, what are the effects of using maximin over max reach
as the objective? We give evidence that when maximizing reach
instead of using maximin, interventions end up strongly reflecting
the existing structure of the network. That is, vertices are more
likely to become seeds if they are close to the center of the network,
where probabilities of receiving the information are already high
and do not need as many additional interventions.
We show this by measuring the correlation between the prob-
ability of receiving information before intervention versus after
intervention. We use as a simple proxy for ‘before intervention’
the probabilities pv when the vertex with the highest degree is the
sole seed. Figure 6a shows the correlation between these two sets
of probabilities in the Arenas graph, and indeed the correlation is
significantly higher when using TIM+ than when using Myopic.
Assuming every vertex is equally deserving of information, we
do not want ‘well-positioned’ vertices to have an advantage simply
because they are well-positioned. Thus, we look at the correlation
between the probability of information access after intervention
and a few other proxies for position in a network. Figures 6b and 6c
show the results for the degrees of the vertices as well as their
distances from the center of the graph. Using TIM+, as the distance
decreases towards the center or the degree of the node increases,
the probabilities of information access increase, leading to a larger
(negative) correlation. Again, this effect is lessened by usingMyopic,
whose resulting probabilities correlate less than TIM+ with both
the degree of the vertex and the distance from the center. In other
words, Myopic reduces the correlation between vertices’ probability
of receiving the information and how well connected the vertices
are. Naïve Myopic yields very similar results to Myopic, as again
seen in Figure 6.
In addition, Myopic changes the distribution of probabilities
{pv1 , . . . ,pv |V | }. Not only does it decrease the number of vertices
with very low probability of receiving the information, but it also
increases the number of vertices with larger probabilities over a
broad range of probabilities, as seen in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Distribution of probabilities over all vertices in the
Arenas graph after adding 100 seeds with α = 0.1.
5.3 Heuristic performance
We now study the behavior of the heuristics described in the previ-
ous section. We would like to know how they compare in terms of
effectiveness (maximizing µ−∞) and speed.
We present effectiveness results in Figure 8. We omitted the
heuristic Greedy when experimenting with larger data sets because
it was prohibitively slow. Note that in both charts, the Myopic and
Naïve Myopic heuristics consistently outperform the other methods
for all ranges of α and intervention size k . The heuristics that do
not use estimation are all consistently poor performers, and TIM+
performs well but is consistently dominated. For the smaller data
sets, shown in Figure 8a, Greedy also does fairly well.
(a) Smaller data sets. (b) Larger data sets.
Figure 8: Comparison of the six heuristics with respect to the minimum probability for values of α = {0.3, 0.4, 0.5}.
Algorithm Average time (s)
Arenas EU Irvine
Random 0.007 0.015 0.012
Gonzalez 0.021 0.031 0.033
Naïve Myopic 0.086 0.208 0.184
TIM+ 0.876 1.826 1.046
Myopic 8.910 19.438 16.755
Greedy 507.35 759.296 1399.26
Table 2: Speed of each of the heuristics on three data sets for
100 seeds. Times to completion are averaged over 20 runs.
The running time of the heuristics is summarized in Table 2,
which shows there is a natural tradeoff between running time and
effectiveness. In particular, while the methods that make no use
of estimation yield poorer quality results, they run extremely fast
because they avoid the expensive step of estimating probabilities.
Among the heuristics that estimate probabilities, Naïve Myopic is
the fastest, with TIM+ also comparable, while the Myopic heuristic
is an order of magnitude more expensive. Greedy is still another
order of magnitude slower than Myopic, making it prohibitively
expensive to compute in even relatively small graphs.
5.4 Performance on max reach
While the goal of the introduced heuristics is to maximize the mini-
mum information access, it is also valuable to measure them by their
average reach 1|V |
∑
v ∈V pv to see if they are effective at spreading
information to a large number of vertices. We compare the perfor-
mance of Naïve Myopic and Myopic to TIM+ on this measure over
three datasets (see Figure 9). The results show that while Naïve
Myopic does not perform well to maximize reach, Myopic appears
Figure 9: Comparison of three heuristics with respect to
reach, the average probability after intervention, for α =
{0.3, 0.4, 0.5}.
to outperform TIM+ even though TIM+ was designed for average
reach and Myopic was not. This is likely because each seed added
by Myopic is guaranteed to increase reach on the graphs, while
algorithms that focus on maximizing reach may inadvertently pro-
vide access to nodes already reached. However, recall that Myopic
is much slower than TIM+ (see Table 2) and so this potential im-
provement does not come without pitfalls. This tradeoff between
average and minimum reach seems worthy of further study.
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